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Abstract
In this paper, we study the notion of adversarial Stackelberg value for two-player non-zero sum
games played on bi-weighted graphs with the mean-payoff and the discounted sum functions. The
adversarial Stackelberg value of Player 0 is the largest value that Player 0 can obtain when an-
nouncing her strategy to Player 1 which in turn responds with any of his best response. For the
mean-payoff function, we show that the adversarial Stackelberg value is not always achievable but
ǫ-optimal strategies exist. We show how to compute this value and prove that the associated
threshold problem is in NP. For the discounted sum payoff function, we draw a link with the target
discounted sum problem which explains why the problem is difficult to solve for this payoff function.
We also provide solutions to related gap problems.
2012 ACM Subject Classification Theory of computation Ñ Solution concepts in game theory;
Theory of computation Ñ Logic and verification
Keywords and phrases Non-zero sum games, reactive synthesis, adversarial Stackelberg.
Acknowledgements We thank anonymous reviewers, Dr. Shibashis Guha and Ms. Mrudula Balachander
for useful comments on a preliminary version of this paper. This work is partially supported by
the PDR project Subgame perfection in graph games (F.R.S.-FNRS), the MIS project F451019F
(F.R.S.-FNRS), the ARC project Non-Zero Sum Game Graphs: Applications to Reactive Syn-
thesis and Beyond (Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles), the EOS project Verifying Learning Artificial
Intelligence Systems (F.R.S.-FNRS & FWO), and the COST Action 16228 GAMENET (European
Cooperation in Science and Technology). Emmanuel Filiot is associate researcher at F.R.S.-FNRS.
2 The Adversarial Stackelberg Value in Quantitative Games
1 Introduction
In this paper, we study two-player non-zero sum infinite duration quantitative games played
on graph games. In non-zero sum games, the notion of worst-case value is not rich enough to
reason about the (rational) behavior of players. More elaborate solution concepts have been
proposed in game theory to reason about non-zero sum games: Nash equilibria, subgames
perfect equilibria, admissibility, and Stackelberg equilibria are important examples of such
solution concepts, see e.g. [18] and [19].
Let us first recall the abstract setting underlying the notion of Stackelberg equilibria
and explain the variant that is the focus of this paper. Stackelberg games are strategic
games played by two players. We note Σ0 the set of strategies of Player 0, also called
the leader, and Σ1 the set of strategies of Player 1, also called the follower. Additionally,
the game comes with two (usually R-valued) payoff functions, Payoff0 and Payoff1, that
determine the payoff each player receives: if σ0 P Σ0 and σ1 P Σ1 are chosen then Player 0
receives the payoff Payoff
0
pσ0, σ1q while Player 1 receives the payoff Payoff1pσ0, σ1q. Both
players aim at maximizing their respective payoffs, and in a Stackelberg game, players play
sequentially as follows. 1 Player 0, the leader, announces her choice of strategy σ0 P Σ0.
2 Player 1, the follower, announces his choice of strategy σ1 P Σ1. 3 Both players receive
their respective payoffs: Payoff0pσ0, σ1q and Payoff1pσ0, σ1q. Due to the sequential nature
of the game, Player 1 knows the strategy σ0, and so to act rationally (s)he should choose
a strategy σ1 that maximizes the payoff Payoff1pσ0, σ1q. If such a strategy σ1 exists, it is
called a best-response 1 to the strategy σ0 P Σ0. In turn, if the leader assumes a rational
response of the follower to her strategy, this should guide the leader when choosing σ0 P Σ0.
Indeed, the leader should choose a strategy σ0 P Σ0 such that the value Payoff0pσ0, σ1q is as
large as possible when σ1 is a best-response of the follower.
Two different scenarios can be considered in this setting: either the best-response σ1 P Σ1
is imposed by the leader (or equivalently chosen cooperatively by the two players), or the
best-response is chosen adversarially by Player 1. In classical results from game theory and
most of the close related works on games played on graphs [13, 15], with the exception
of [17], only the cooperative scenario has been investigated. But, the adversarial case is
interesting because it allows us to model the situation in which the leader chooses σ0 P Σ0
only and must be prepared to face any rational response of Player 1, i.e. if Player 1 has
several possible best responses then σ0 should be designed to face all of them. In this paper,
our main contribution is to investigate the second route. As already noted in [17], this route
is particularly interesting for applications in automatic synthesis. Indeed, when designing a
program, and this is especially true for reactive programs [20, 3], we aim for robust solutions
that works for multiple rational usages, e.g. all the usages that respect some specification
or that maximize some measure for the user.
To reflect the two scenarios above, there are two notions of Stackelberg values. First,
the cooperative Stackelberg value is the largest value that Player 0 can secure by proposing a
strategy σ0 and a strategy σ1 to the follower with the constraint that σ1 is a best-response for
the follower to σ0. Second, the adversarial Stackelberg value is the largest value that Player 0
can secure by proposing a strategy σ0 and facing any best response σ1 of the follower to the
strategy σ0. In this paper, we mostly concentrate on the adversarial Stackelberg value, for
infinite duration games played on bi-weighted game graphs for the mean-payoff function and
1 As we will see later in the paper, sometimes, best-responses are not guaranteed to exist. In such cases,
we need to resort to weaker notions such as ǫ-best-responses. We leave those technical details for later
in the paper.
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the discounted sum function. The cooperative case has been studied in [13, 15] and we only
provide some additional results when relevant for that case (see also related works below).
Main contributions First, we consider the mean-payoff function. For this payoff function,
best responses of Player 1 to a strategy σ0 P Σ0 not always exist (Lemma 3). As a con-
sequence, the cooperative (CSV) and adversarial (ASV) Stackelberg values are defined using
ǫ-best responses. While strategies of Player 0 to achieve CSV always exist as shown in [13],
we show that it is not the case for ASV (Theorem 4). The ASV can only be approached
in general and memory may be necessary to play optimally or ǫ-optimally in adversarial
Stackelberg games for the mean-payoff function (Theorem 4). We also provide results for
related algorithmic problems. We provide a notion of witness for proving that the ASV is
(strictly) above some threshold (Theorem 5), and it is the basis for an NP algorithm to
solve the threshold problem (Theorem 7). Finally, we show how the ASV can be computed
effectively (Theorem 12).
Second, we consider the discounted sum function. In that case, best responses of Player 1
to strategies σ0 P Σ0 of Player 0 always exist (Lemma 13). The CSV and ASV are directly
based on best-responses in that case. Then we draw a link between the target discounted
sum problem and the CSV threshold problem (Lemma 15). The target discounted sum
problem has been studied recently in [2], left open there for the general case and shown
to be related to other open problems in piecewise affine maps and the representation of
numbers in nonintegral bases. As a consequence, we introduce a relaxation of the threshold
problems for both CSV and ASV in the form of gap problems (or promised problems as
defined in [12]). We provide algorithms to solve those gap problems (Theorem 17) both for
CSV and ASV. Finally, we prove NP-hardness for the gap problems both for CSV and ASV
(Theorem 18).
Closely related work The notions of cooperative and adversarial synthesis have been
introduced in [11, 17], and further studied in [8, 10]. Those two notions are closely related
to our notion of cooperative and adversarial Stackelberg value respectively. The games that
are considered in those papers are infinite duration games played on graphs but they consider
Boolean ω-regular payoff functions or finite range ω-regular payoff functions. Neither the
mean-payoff function nor the discounted sum payoff function are ω-regular, and thus they
are not considered in [11, 17]. The ω-regularity of the payoff functions that they consider
is central to their techniques: they show how to reduce their problems to problems on tree
automata and strategy logic. Those reductions cannot be used for payoff functions that are
not ω-regular functions and we need specific new techniques to solve our problems.
In [13, 15], the cooperative scenario for Stackelberg game is studied for mean-payoff
and discounted sum respectively. Their results are sufficient to solve most of the relevant
questions on the CSV but not for ASV. Indeed, the techniques that are used for CSV are
closely related to the techniques that are used to reason on Nash equilibria and build on
previous works [5] which in turn reduce to algorithmic solutions for zero-sum one dimensional
mean-payoff (or discounted sum games). For the ASV in the context of the mean-payoff
function, we have to use more elaborate multi-dim. mean-payoff games and a notion of
Pareto curve adapted from [4]. Additionally, we provide new results on the CSV for the
discounted sum function. First, our reduction that relates the target discounted sum problem
to the CSV is new and gives additional explanations why the CSV is difficult to solve and
not solved in the general case in [15]. Second, while we also leave the general problem open
here, we show how to solve the gap problems related to both CSV and ASV. Finally, the
authors of [14] study incentive equilibria for multi-player mean-payoff games. This work
is an extension of their previous work [13] and again concentrates on CSV and does not
4 The Adversarial Stackelberg Value in Quantitative Games
consider ASV.
Structure of the paper In Sect. 2, we introduce the necessary preliminaries for our
definitions and developments. In Sect. 3, we consider the adversarial Stackelberg value for
the mean-payoff function. In Sect. 4, we present our results for the discounted sum function.
2 Preliminaries and notations
Arenas A (bi-weighted) arena A “ pV,E, xV0, V1y, w0, w1q consists of a finite set V of
vertices, a set E Ď V ˆ V of edges such that for all v P V there exists v1 P V such that
pv, v1q P E, a partition xV0, V1y of V , where V0 (resp. V1) is the set of vertices for Player 0
(resp. Player 1), and two edge weight functions w0 : E ÞÑ Z, w1 : E ÞÑ Z. In the sequel, we
denote the maximum absolute value of a weight in A byW . As arenas are directed weighted
graphs, we use, sometimes without recalling the details, the classical vocabulary for directed
graphs. E.g., a set of vertices S Ď V is a strongly connected component of the arena (SCC
for short), if for all s1, s2 P S, there exists a path from s1 to s2 and a path from s2 to s1.
Plays and histories A play in A is an infinite sequence of vertices π “ π0π1 ¨ ¨ ¨ P V ω such
that for all k P N, pπk, πk`1q P E. We denote by PlaysA the set of plays in A, omitting the
subscript A when the underlying arena is clear from the context. Given π “ π0π1 ¨ ¨ ¨ P PlaysA
and k P N, the prefix π0π1 . . . πk of π (resp. suffix πkπk`1 . . . of π) is denoted by πďk (resp.
πěk). An history in A is a (non-empty) prefix of a play in A. The length |h| of an history
h “ πďk is the number |h| “ k of its edges. We denote by HistA the set of histories in A,
A is omitted when clear from the context. Given i P t0, 1u, the set HistiA denotes the set
of histories such that their last vertex belongs to Vi. We denote the last vertex of a history
h by lastphq. We write h ď π whenever h is a prefix of π. A play π is called a lasso if it
is obtained as the concatenation of a history h concatenated with the infinite repetition of
another history l, i.e. π “ h ¨ lω with h, l P HistA (notice that l is not necessary a simple
cycle). The size of a lasso h ¨ lω is defined as |h ¨ l|. Given a vertex v P V in the arena A, we
denote by Succpvq “ tv1|pv, v1q P Eu the set of successors of v and by Succ˚ its transitive
closure.
Games A game G “ pA, xVal0,Val1yq consists of a bi-weighted arena A, a value function
Val0 : PlaysA ÞÑ R for Player 0 and a value function Val1 : PlaysA ÞÑ R for Player 1. In this
paper, we consider the classical mean-payoff and discounted-sum value functions. Both are
played in bi-weighted arenas.
In a mean-payoff game G “ pA, xMP0,MP1yq the payoff functions MP0,MP1 are defined
as follows. Given a play π P PlaysA and i P t0, 1u, the payoff MPipπq is given by MPipπq “
lim infkÑ8
1
k
wipπďkq, where the weight wiphq of an history h P Hist is the sum of the weights
assigned by wi to its edges. In our definition of the mean-payoff, we have used lim inf, we
will also need the lim sup case for technical reasons. Here is the formal definition together
with its notation: MPipπq “ lim supkÑ8
1
k
wipπďkq
For a given discount factor 0 ă λ ă 1, a discounted sum game is a game G “ pA, xDSλ0 ,DS
λ
1 yq
where the payoff functions DSλ0 ,DS
λ
1 are defined as follows. Given a play π P PlaysA and
i P t0, 1u, the payoff DSλi pπq is defined as DS
λ
i pπq “
ř8
k“0 λ
kwipπk, πk`1q.
Strategies and payoffs A strategy for Player i P t0, 1u in a game G “ pA, xVal0,Val1yq is
a function σ : HistiA ÞÑ V that maps histories ending with a vertex v P Vi to a successor of
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v. The set of all strategies of Player i P t0, 1u in the game G is denoted ΣipGq, or Σi when
G is clear from the context.
A strategy has memory M if it can be realized as the output of a finite state machine
with M states. A memoryless (or positional) strategy is a strategy with memory 1, that is,
a function that only depends on the last element of the given partial play. We note ΣMLi
the set of memoryless strategies of Player i, and ΣFMi its set of finite memory strategies.
A profile is a pair of strategies σ¯ “ pσ0, σ1q, where σ0 P Σ0pGq and σ1 P Σ1pGq. As we
consider games with perfect information and deterministic transitions, any profile σ¯ yields,
from any history h, a unique play or outcome, denoted OuthpG, σ¯q. Formally, OuthpG, σ¯q
is the play π such that πď|h|´1 “ h and @k ě |h| ´ 1 it holds that πk`1 “ σipπďkq if
πk P Vi. The set of outcomes (resp. histories) compatible with a strategy σ P ΣiPt0,1upGq
after a history h is OuthpG, σq “ tπ | Dσ1 P Σ1´ipGq such that π “ OuthpG, pσ, σ1qqu (resp.
Histhpσq “ th
1 P HistpGq | Dπ P OuthpG, σq, n P N : h1 “ πďnu.
Each outcome π in G “ pA, xVal0,Val1yq yields a payoff Valpπq “ pVal0pπq,Val1pπqq,
where Val0pπq is the payoff for Player 0 and Val1pπq is the payoff for Player 1. We denote
by Valph, σ¯q “ ValpOuthpG, σ¯qq the payoff of a profile of strategies σ¯ after a history h.
Usually, we consider game instances such that players start to play at a fixed vertex
v0. Thus, we call an initialized game a pair pG, v0q, where G is a game and v0 P V is
the initial vertex. When the initial vertex v0 is clear from context, we speak directly of
G,OutpG, σ¯q,OutpG, σq, Valpσ¯q instead of pG, v0q, Outv0pG, σ¯q, Outv0pG, σq,Valpv0, σ¯q . We
sometimes simplify further the notation omitting also G, when the latter is clear from the
context.
Best-responses and adversarial value in zero-sum games Let G “ pA, xVal0,Val1yq
be a pVal0,Val1q-game on the bi-weighted arena A. Given a strategy σ0 for Player 0, we
define two sets of strategies for Player 1. His best-responses to σ0, noted BR1pσ0q, and
defined as:
 
σ1 P Σ1 | @v P V ¨ @σ
1
1
P Σ1 : Val1pOutvpσ0, σ1qq ě Val1pOutvpσ0, σ
1
1
qq
(
.
And his ǫ-best-responses to σ0, for ǫ ą 0, noted BR
ǫ
1pσ0q, and defined as:
 
σ1 P Σ1 | @v P V ¨ @σ
1
1 P Σ1 : Val1pOutvpσ0, σ1q ě Val1pOutvpσ0, σ
1
1qq ´ ǫ
(
.
We also introduce notations for zero-sum games (that are needed as intermediary steps in our
algorithms). The adversarial value that Player 1 can enforce in the game G from vertex v as:
WCV1pvq “ supσ1PΣ1 infσ0PΣ0 Val1pOutvpσ0, σ1qq. Let A be an arena, v P V one of its states,
and O Ď PlaysA be a set of plays (called objective), then we write A, v |ù ! i " O, if Dσi P
Σi ¨ @σ1´i P Σ1´i : OutvpA, pσ, σ1qq P O, for i P t0, 1u. Here the underlying interpretation is
zero-sum: Player i wants to force an outcome in O and Player 1´ i has the opposite goal.
All the zero-sum games we consider in this paper are determined meaning that for all A, for
all objectives O Ď PlaysA we have that: A, v |ù ! i " O iff A, v * ! 1´ i " PlaysAzO.
Convex hull and Fmin First, we need som e additional notations and vocabulary related to
linear algebra. Given a finite set of d-dim. vectorsX Ă Rd, we note the set of all their convex
combinations as CHpXq “ tv | v “
ř
xPX αx ¨ x^ @x P X : αx P r0, 1s ^
ř
xPX αx “ 1u, this
set is called the convex hull of X . We also need the following additional, and less standard
notions, introduced in [6]. Given a finite set of d-dim. vectors X Ă Rd, let fminpXq be
the vector v “ pv1, v2, . . . , vdq where vi “ min tc | Dx P X : xi “ cu, i.e. the vector v
is the pointwise minimum of the vectors in X . Let S Ď Rd, then FminpSq “ tfminpP q |
P is a finite subset of Su. The following proposition expresses properties of the FminpSq
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operator that are useful for us in the sequel. The interested reader will find more results
about the Fmin operator in [6].
§ Proposition 1. For all sets S Ď Rd, for all x P FminpSq, there exists y P S such that x ď y.
If S is a closed bounded set then FminpSq is also a closed bounded set.
In the sequel, we also use formulas of the theory of the reals with addition and order,
noted xR,`,ďy, in order to define subsets of Rn. This theory is decidable and admits
effective quantifier elimination [9].
3 Adversarial Stackelberg value for mean-payoff games
Mean-payoffs induced by simple cycles Given a play π P PlaysA, we note infpπq the
set of vertices v that appear infinitely many times along π, i.e. infpπq “ tv | @i P N ¨ Dj ě
i : v “ πju. It is easy to see that infpπq is an SCC in the underlying graph of the arena A.
A cycle c is a sequence of edges that starts and stops in a given vertex v, it is simple if it
does not contain any other repetition of vertices. Given an SCC S, we write CpSq for the
set of simple cycles inside S. Given a simple cycle c, for i P t0, 1u, let MPipcq “
wipcq
|c| be the
mean of wi weights along edges in the simple cycle c, and we call the pair pMP0pcq,MP1pcqq
the mean-payoff coordinate of the cycle c. We write CHpCpSqq for the convex-hull of the set
of mean-payoff coordinates of simple cycles of S. The following theorem relates the d-dim.
mean-payoff values of infinite plays and the d-dim. mean-payoff of simple cycles in the arena.
§ Theorem 2 ([6]). Let S be an SCC in the arena A, the following two properties hold: piq for
all π P PlaysA, if infpπq Ď S then pMP0pπq,MP1pπqq P FminpCHpCpSqqq piiq for all px, yq P
FminpCHpCpSqqq, there exists π P PlaysA such that infpπq “ S and pMP0pπq,MP1pπqq “ px, yq.
Furthermore, the set FminpCHpCpSqqq is effectively expressible in xR,`,ďy.
In the sequel, we denote by ΦSpx, yq the formula with two free variables in xR,`,ďy
such that for all pu, vq P R2, pu, vq P FminpCHpCpSqqq if and only if ΦSpx, yqrx{u, y{vs is true.
On the existence of best-responses for MP We start the study of mean-payoff games
with some considerations about the existence of best-responses and ǫ-best-responses for
Player 1 to strategies of Player 0.
§ Lemma 3. There is a mean-payoff game G and a strategy σ0 P Σ0pGq such that BR1pσ0q “
∅. For all mean-payoff games G and finite memory strategies σ0 P ΣFM0 pGq, BR1pσ0q ‰ ∅.
For all mean-payoff games G, for all strategies σ0 P Σ0pGq, for all ǫ ą 0, BR
ǫ
1
pσ0q ‰ ∅.
Proof sketch - full proof in Appendix. First, in the arena of Fig. 1, we consider the strategy
of Player 0 that plays the actions c and d with a frequency that is equal to 1´ 1
k
for c and
1
k
for d where k is the number of times that Player 1 has played a in state 1 before sending
the game to state 2. We claim that there is no best response of Player 1 to this strategy of
Player 0. Indeed, taking a one more time before going to state 2 is better for Player 1.
Second, if Player 0 plays a finite memory strategy, then a best response for Player 1 is
an optimal path for the mean-payoff of Player 1 in the finite graph obtained as the product
of the original game arena with the finite state strategy of Player 0. Optimal mean-payoff
paths are guaranteed to exist [16].
Finally, the existence of ǫ-best responses for ǫ ą 0, is guaranteed by an analysis of
the infinite tree obtained as the unfolding of the game arena with the (potentially infinite
memory) strategy of Player 1. Branches of this tree witness responses of Player 1 to the
strategy of Player 0. The supremum of the values of those branches for Player 1 is always
approachable to any ǫ ą 0. 
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1 2 3
(0,0)
a
(0,0)
b
(0,1)
d
(0,2)
c
(0,2)
c
(0,1)
d
Figure 1 A mean-payoff game in which there exists a Player 0’s strategy σ0 such that BR1pσ0q “
∅.
v0v1 v2
p0, 1q
(0,1)(0,2)
(1,1)
(1,1)
Figure 2 In this game, ASVpv0q “ 1 but there is no Player 0 strategy to achieve this value.
According to Lemma 3, the set of best-responses of Player 1 to a strategy of Player 0
can be empty. As a consequence, we need to use the notion of ǫ-best-responses (which are
always guaranteed to exist) when we define the adversarial Stackelberg value:
ASVpσ0qpvq “ sup
ǫě0 | BRǫ
1
pσ0q‰∅
inf
σ1PBRǫ1pσ0q
MP
0
pOutvpσ0, σ1qq and ASVpvq “ sup
σ0PΣ0
ASVpσ0qpvq
We note that when best-responses to a strategy σ0 exist, then as expected the following
equality holds, because BR1pσ0q “ BR
0
1
pσ0q and BR
ǫ1
1
pσ0q Ď BR
ǫ2
1
pσ0q for all ǫ1 ď ǫ2, ǫ
should be taken equal to 0:
ASVpσ0qpvq “ sup
ǫě0 | BRǫ
1
pσ0q‰∅
inf
σ1PBRǫ1pσ0q
MP0pOutvpσ0, σ1qq “ inf
σ1PBR1pσ0q
MP0pOutvpσ0, σ1qq
Finally, we note that changing the sup over ǫ into an inf in our definition, we get the classical
notion of worst-case value in which the rationality of Player 1 and his payoff are ignored.
We also recall the definition of CSV, the cooperative Stackelberg value:
CSVpσ0qpvq “ sup
ǫě0 | BRǫ
1
pσ0q‰∅
sup
σ1PBRǫ1pσ0q
MP
0
pOutvpσ0, σ1qq and CSVpvq “ sup
σ0PΣ0
CSVpσ0qpvq
The interest reader is referred to [13] for an in-depth treatment of this value.
The adversarial Stackelberg value may not be achievable In contrast with results in [13]
that show that CSV can always be achieved, the following statement expresses the fact that
the adversarial Stackelberg value may not be achievable but it can always be approximated
by a strategy of Player 0.
§ Theorem 4. There exists a mean-payoff game G in which Player 0 has no strategy which
enforces the adversarial Stackelberg value. Furthermore, for all mean-payoff games G, for
all vertices v P V , for all ǫ ą 0, there exists a strategy σ0 P Σ0 such that ASVpσ0qpvq ą
ASVpvq ´ ǫ. Memory is needed to achieve high ASV.
Proof sketch - full proof in Appendix. First, consider the game depicted in Fig 2. In this
game, ASVpv0q “ 1 and it is not achievable. Player 0 needs to ensure that Player 1 does not
take the transition from v0 to v2 otherwise she gets a payoff of 0. To ensure this, Player 0
needs to choose a strategy (that cycles within tv0, v1u) and that gives to Player 1 at least
1` ǫ with ǫ ą 0. Such strategies gives 1´ ǫ to Player 0, and the value 1 cannot be reached.
Second, by definition of the ASV, the value is obtained as the sup over all strategies of
Player 0. As a consequence, ǫ-optimal strategies (for ǫ ą 0q exist. 
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Witnesses for the ASV Given a mean-payoff game G, we associate with each vertex v, the
following set of pairs of real numbers: Λpvq “ tpc, dq P R2 | v |ù ! 1 " MP
0
ď c^MP
1
ě du.
We say that v is pc, dq-bad if pc, dq P Λpvq. Let c1 P R. A play π in G is called a pc1, dq-witness
of ASVpvq ą c if it starts from v, pMP0pπq,MP1pπqq “ pc
1, dq, c1 ą c and π does not contain
any pc, dq-bad vertex. A play π is called a witness of ASVpvq ą c if it is a pc1, dq-witness of
ASVpvq ą c for some c1, d. The following theorem justifies the name witness.
§ Theorem 5. Let G be a mean-payoff game and v be one of its vertices. ASVpvq ą c iff
there exists a play π in G such that π is a witness of ASVpvq ą c.
Proof. From right to left. Assume the existence of a pc1, dq-witness π and let us show that
there exists a strategy σ0 which forces ASVpσ0qpvq ą c. We define σ0 as follows:
1. for all histories h ď π such that lastphq belongs to Player 0, σ0phq follows π.
2. for all histories h ę π where there has been a deviation from π by Player 1, we assume
that Player 0 switches to a strategy that we call punishing. This strategy is defined as
follows. In the subgame after history h1 where h1 is a first deviation by Player 1 from
π, we know that Player 0 has a strategy to enforce the objective: MP
0
ą c _MP
1
ă d.
This is true because π does not cross any pc, dq-bad vertex. So, we know that h1 *
! 1 " MP
0
ď c ^ MP
1
ě d which entails the previous statement by determinacy of
n-dimension mean-payoff games [22] (here n “ 2).
3. for all other histories h, Player 0 can behave arbitrarily as those histories are never
reached when Player 0 plays as defined in point 1 and 2 above.
Let us now establish that the strategy σ0 satisfies ASVpσ0qpvq ą c. We have to show the exist-
ence of some ǫ ě 0 such that BRǫ
1
pσ0q ‰ ∅ and for all σ1 P BR
ǫ
1
pσ0q, MP0pOutvpσ0, σ1qq ą c
holds. For that, we consider two subcases:
1. supσ1 MP1pOutvpσ0, σ1qq “ d “ MP1pπq. This means that any strategy σ1 of Player 1
that follows π is for ǫ “ 0 a best-response to σ0. Now let us consider any strategy
σ1 P BR
0
1pσ0q. Clearly, π
1 “ Outvpσ0, σ1q is such that MP1pπ
1q ě d. If π1 “ π, we
have that MP0pπ
1q “ c1 ą c. If π1 ‰ π, then when π1 deviates from π, we know that
σ0 behaves as the punishing strategy and so we have that MP0pπ
1q ą c _MP
1
pπ1q ă d.
But as σ1 P BR
0
1
pσ0q, we conclude that MP1pπ
1q ě d, and so in turn, we obtain that
MP
0
pπ1q ą c.
2. supσ1 MP1pOutvpσ0, σ1qq “ d
1 ą d. Let ǫ ą 0 be such that d1 ´ ǫ ą d. By Lemma 3,
BRǫ1pσ0q ‰ ∅. Let us now characterize the value that Player 0 receives against any
strategy σ1 P BR
ǫ
1pσ0q. First, if σ1 follows π then Player 0 receives c
1 ą c. Second, if σ1
deviates from π, Player 1 receives at least d1 ´ ǫ ą d. But by definition of σ0, we know
that if the play deviates from π then Player 0 applies her punishing strategy. Then we
know that the outcome satisfies MP
0
ą c_MP
1
ă d. But as d1´ǫ ą d, we must conclude
that the outcome π1 is such that MP
0
pπ1q ą c.
From left to right. Let σ0 such that ASVpσ0qpvq ą c. Then by the equivalence shown in the
proof of Theorem 4, we know that
Dǫ ě 0 : BRǫ1pσ0q ‰ ∅^ @σ1 P BR
ǫ
1pσ0q : Outvpσ0, σ1q ą c (1)
Let ǫ˚ be a value for ǫ that makes eq. (1) true. Take any σ1 P BR
ǫ˚
1 pσ0q and consider
π “ Outvpσ0, σ1q. We will show that π is a witness for ASVpvq ą c.
We have that MP
0
pπq ą c. Let d1 “ MP1pπq and consider any π
1 P Outvpσ0q. Clearly if
MP
1
pπ1q ě d1 then there exists σ11 P BR
ǫ˚
1
pσ0q such that π1 “ Outv0pσ0, σ
1
1
q and we conclude
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that MP
0
pπ1q ą c. So all deviations of Player 1 w.r.t. π against σ0 are either giving him
a MP
1
which is less than d1 or it gives to Player 0 a MP0 which is larger than c. So π
is a pMP
0
pπq,MP
1
pπqq-witness for ASVpvq ą c as we have shown that π never crosses an
pc,MP1pπqq-bad vertex, and we are done. 
The following statement is a direct consequence of the proof of the previous theorem.
§ Corollary 6. If π is a witness for ASVpvq ą c then all π1 such that: π1p0q “ v, the set of
vertices visited along π and π1 are the same, and MP
0
pπ1q ě MP
0
pπq and MP
1
pπ1q ě MP
1
pπq,
are also witnesses for ASVpvq ą c.
Small witnesses and NP membership Here, we refine Theorem 5 to establish membership
of the threshold problem to NP.
§ Theorem 7. Given a mean-payoff game G, a vertex v and a rational value c P Q, it can
be decided in nondeterministic polynomial time if ASVpvq ą c.
Proof of Thm. 7 relies on the existence of small witnesses established in the following lemma:
§ Lemma 8. Given a mean-payoff game G, a vertex v and c P Q, ASVpvq ą c if and only
if there exists an SCC reachable from v that contains two simple cycles ℓ1, ℓ2 such that: piq
there exist α, β P Q such that α ¨w0pℓ1q ` β ¨w0pℓ2q “ c
1 ą c, and α ¨w1pℓ1q ` β ¨w1pℓ2q “ d
piiq there is no pc, dq-bad vertex v1 along the path from v to ℓ1, the path from ℓ1 to ℓ2, and
the path from ℓ2 to ℓ1.
Proof sketch - full proof in Appendix. Theorem 5 establishes the existence of a witness π
for ASVpvq ą c. In turn, we show here that the existence of such a π can be established
by a polynomially checkable witness composed of the following elements. First, a simple
path from v to the SCC in which π gets trapped in the long run, piiq two simple cycles
(that can produce the value pc1, dq of π) by looping at the right frequencies along the two
cycles. Indeed, pMP
0
pπq,MP
1
pπqq only depends on the suffix in the SCC in which it gets
trapped. Furthermore, by Theorem 2, Proposition 1 and Corollary 6, we know that the
mean-payoff of witnesses can be obtained as the convex combination of the mean-payoff
coordinates of simple cycles, and 3 such simple cycles are sufficient by the CarathÃ©odory
baricenter theorem. A finer analysis of the geometry of the sets allows us to go to 2 cycles
only (see the full proof in appendix). 
Proof of Theorem 7. According to Lemma 8, the nondeterministic algorithm that estab-
lishes the membership to NP guesses a reachable SCC together with the two simple cycles
ℓ1 and ℓ2, and parameters α and β. Additionally, for each vertex v1 that appears along
the paths to reach the SCC, on the simple cycles ℓ1 and ℓ2, and to connect those simple
cycles, the algorithm guesses a memoryless strategy σv
1
0
for Player 0 that establishes v1 *
! 1 " MP
0
ď c^MP
1
ě d which means by determinacy of multi-dimensional mean-payoff
games, that v1 ( ! 0 " MP
0
ą c_MP
1
ă d. The existence of those memoryless strategy is
established in Propositions 20 and 21 given in appendix (in turn those propositions rely on
results from [22]). Those memoryless strategies are checkable in PTime [16]. 
Computing the ASV in mean-payoff games The previous theorems establish the existence
of a notion of witness for the adversarial Stackelberg value in non zero-sum two-player mean-
payoff games. This notion of witness can be used to decide the threshold problem in NPtime.
We now show how to use this notion to effectively compute the ASV. This algorithm is also
based on the computation of an effective representation, for each vertex v of the game graph,
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of the infinite set of pairs Λpvq. The following lemma expresses that a symbolic representation
of this set of pairs can be constructed effectively. This result is using techniques that have
been introduced in [4].
§ Lemma 9. Given a bi-weighted game graph G and a vertex v P V , we can effectively
construct a formula Ψvpx, yq of xR,`,ďy with two free variables such that pc, dq P Λpvq if
and only if the formula Ψvpx, yqrx{c, y{ds is true.
Extended graph game From the graph game G “ pV,E,w0, w1q, we construct the extended
graph game Gext “ pV ext, Eext, wext0 , w
ext
1 q, whose vertices and edges are defined as follows.
The set of vertices is V ext “ V ˆ 2V . With an history h in G, we associate a vertex in
Gext which is a pair pv, P q, where v “ lastphq and P is the set of the vertices traversed
along h. Accordingly the set of edges and the weight functions are defined as Eext “
tppv, P q, pv1, P 1qq | pv, v1q P E ^ P 1 “ P Y tv1uu and wexti ppv, P q, pv
1, P 1qq “ wippv, v
1qq, for i P
t0, 1u. Clearly, there exists a bijection between the plays π in G and the plays πext in Gext
which start in vertices of the form pv, tvuq, i.e. πext is mapped to the play π in G that is
obtained by erasing the second dimension of its vertices.
§ Proposition 10. For all game graph G, the following holds:
1. Let πext be an infinite play in the extended graph and π be its projection into the original
graph G (over the first component of each vertex) , the following properties hold: piq For
all i ă j: if πextpiq “ pvi, Piq and π
extpjq “ pvj , Pjq then Pi Ď Pj. piiq MPipπ
extq “
MPipπq, for i P t0, 1u.
2. The unfolding of G from v and the unfolding of Gext from pv, tvuq are isomorphic, and so
ASVpvq “ ASVpv, tvuq.
By the first point of the latter proposition and since the set of vertices of the graph is
finite, the second component of any play πext stabilises into a set of vertices of G which we
denote by V ˚pπextq.
We now show how to characterize ASVpvq with the notion of witness introduced above
and the decomposition of Gext into SCC. This is formalized in the following lemma:
§ Lemma 11. For all mean-payoff games G, for all vertices v P V , let SCCextpvq be the set
of strongly-connected components in Gext which are reachable from pv, tvuq, then we have
ASVpvq “ max
SPSCCextpvq
suptc P R | Dπext : πext is a witness for ASVpv, tvuq ą c and V ˚pπextq “ Su
Proof. First, we note the following sequence of equalities:
ASVpvq
“ suptc P R | ASVpvq ě cu
“ suptc P R | ASVpvq ą cu
“ suptc P R | Dπ : π is a witness for ASVpvq ą cu
“ suptc P R | Dπext : πext is a witness for ASVpv, tvuq ą cu
“ maxSPSCCextpvq suptc P R | Dπ
ext : πext is a witness for ASVpv, tvuq ą c and V ˚pπextq “ Su
The first two equalities are direct consequences of the definition of the supremum and that
ASVpvq P R. The third is a consequence of Theorem 5 that guarantees the existence of
witnesses for strict inequalities. The fourth equality is a consequence of point 2 in Proposi-
tion 10. The last equality is the consequence of point 1 in Proposition 10. 
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By definition of Gext, for all SCC S of Gext, there exists a set of vertices of G which we
also denote by V ˚pSq such that any vertex of S is of the form pv, V ˚pSqq. The set of bad
thresholds for S is then defined as ΛextpSq “
Ť
vPV ˚pSq Λpvq. Applying Lemma 9, we can
construct a formula ΨSpx, yq which symbolic encodes the set ΛextpSq.
Now, we are equipped to prove that ASVpvq is effectively computable. This is expressed
by the following theorem and established in its proof.
§ Theorem 12. For all mean-payoff games G, for all vertices v P V , the value ASVpvq can be
effectively expressed by a formula ρv in xR,`,ďy and explicitly computed from this formula.
Proof. To establish this theorem, we show how to build the formula ρvpzq that is true
iff ASVpvq “ z. We use Lemma 11, to reduce this to the construction of a formula that
expresses the existence of witnesses for ASVpvq from pv, tvuq:
ASVpvq “ max
SPSCCextpvq
suptc P R | Dπext : πext is a witness for ASVpv, tvuq ą c and V ˚pπextq “ Su
As maxSPSCCextpvq is easily expressed in xR,`,ďy, we concentrate on one SCC S reachable
from pv, tvuq and we show how to express
suptc P R | Dπext : πext is a witness for ASVpv, tvuq ą c and V ˚pπextq “ Su
First, we define a formula that express the existence of a witness for ASVpvq ą c. This is
done by the following formula:
ρSv0pcq ” Dx, y ¨ x ą c^ ΦSpx, yq ^  ΨSpc, yq
Where ΦSpx, yq is the symbolic encoding of FminpCHpCpSqqq as defined in Theorem 2. This
ensures that the values px, yq are the mean-payoff values realizable by some path in S. By
Lemma 9,  ΨSpc, yq expresses that the path does not cross a pc, yq-bad vertex. So the
conjunction Dx, y ¨ x ą c^ ΦSpx, yq ^  ΨSpc, yq establishes the existence of a witness with
mean-payoff values px, yq for the threshold c. From this formula, we can compute the ASV
by quantifier elimination in:
Dz ¨ @e ą 0 ¨ pρSv0pz ´ eq ^ p@y ¨ ρ
S
v0
pyq ùñ y ď zqq
and obtain the unique value of z that makes the formula true. 
4 Stackelberg values for discounted-sum games
In this section, we study the notion of Stackelberg value in the case of discounted sum
measures. Beside the adversarial setting considered so far, we also refer to a cooperative
framework for discounted sum-games, since we add some results to [15], where the cooper-
ative Stackelberg value for discounted-sum measures has been previously introduced and
studied.
On the existence of best-responses for DS First, we show that the set of best-responses
for Player 1 to strategies of Player 0 is guaranteed to be nonempty for discounted sum games,
while this was not the case in mean-payoff games.
§ Lemma 13. For all discounted sum games G and strategies σ0 P Σ0pGq, BR1pσ0q ‰ ∅.
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Proof. Given σ P Σ0pGq, consider S “ tDS1pOutpσ, τqq | τ P Σ1pGqu. S is a non empty
limited subset of R, since for each τ P Σ1pGq it holds DS1pOutpσ, τqq ď
W
1´ λ
, where
W is the maximum absolute value of a weight in G. Hence, S admits a unique superior
extreme s “ suppSq. By definition of superior extreme, for each ǫ ą 0, there exists vǫ P S
such that s ě vǫ ą s ´ ǫ. Therefore, for each ǫ ą 0 there exists τǫ P Σ1pGq such that
s ě DS1pOutpσ, τǫqq ą s´ ǫ, i.e.:
0 ď s´ DS1pOutpσ, τǫqq ă ǫ (2)
We show that this implies that Outpσq contains a play π˚ such that DS1pπ˚q “ s, which
leads to BR1pσq ‰ ∅, since Player 1 has a strategy to achieve s “ supptDS1pOutpσ, τqq | τ P
Σ1pGquq.
By contradiction, suppose that Outpσq does not contain any play π such that DS1pπq “ s.
Hence, for each π P Outpσq, it holds that DS1pπq ă s and π admits a prefix πďk such that:
DS1pπďkq `W
λk
1´ λ
ă s (3)
Hence, we can cut each play in Outpσq as soon as Equation 3 is accomplished, leading to a
finite tree T (by Konig lemma, since Outpσq is finitely branching). Let π˚T “ π0 . . . πk be a
branch in the finite tree T such that the value vpπ˚T q “ s´ pDS1pπ
˚
T q `W
λk
1´λq is minimal.
Note that, by Equation 3, vpπ˚T q ą 0 since vpπ
˚
T q “ s´ pDS1pπ
˚
T q `W
λk
1´λ q ą s´ s “ 0.
Then, for each play π, let πďp be the longest prefix of π which is also a branch in the
finite tree T . By definition of π˚T , we have:
s´ DS1pπq ě s´ pDS1pπďpq `W
λp
1´ λ
q ě vpπ˚T q ą 0 (4)
This leads to a contradiction to the fact that for all ǫ ą 0 there exists τ P Σ1pGq such that
s´ DS1pOutpσ, τǫqq ă ǫ, established within Equation 2. 
Stackelberg values for DS in the adversarial and cooperative settings The existence of
best-responses allows us to simplify the notion of Stackelberg value for discounted sum meas-
ures, avoiding the parameter ǫ used for mean-payoff games. In particular, the adversarial
Stackelberg value ASVpvq for discounted sum games is defined for all σ0 P Σ0pGq as:
ASVpσ0qpvq “ inf
σ1PBR1pσ0q
DSλ0 pOutvpσ0, σ1qq and ASVpvq “ sup
σ0PΣ0
ASVpσ0qpvq
As previously announced, we also consider the notion of Stackelberg value for discounted sum
measures in the cooperative setting, where Player 0 suggests a profile of strategies pσ0, σ1q
and Player 1 agrees to play σ1 if the latter strategy is a best response to σ0. Formally, the
cooperative Stackelberg value CSVpvq for discounted sum games is defined as:
CSVpσ0qpvq “ sup
σ1PBR1pσ0q
DSλ0 pOutvpσ0, σ1qq and CSVpvq “ sup
σ0PΣ0
CSVpσ0qpvq
Lemma 15 below links the cooperative Stackelberg value for discounted-sum measures to
the target discounted-sum problem [2] (cfr. Definition 14), whose decidability is notoriously
hard to solve and relates to several open questions in mathematics and computer science [2].
§ Definition 14 (Target Discount Sum Problem [2] (TDS)). Given a rational discount factor
0 ă λ ă 1 and three rationals a, b, t does there exist an infinite sequence w P ta, buω such
that
ř8
i“0 wpiqλ
i “ t?
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v
z s a
b
(0,0)
pλ ¨ t´ 1,´λ ¨ tq p0, 0q
pb,´bq
pa,´aq
pb,´bq
pa,´aq
pa,´aq
pb,´bq
Figure 3 The instance of TDS I “ pa, b, λ, tq admits a solution iff CSVpvq ě λ ¨ t.
In particular, given an instance I “ pa, b, t, λq of the TDS problem, Figure 3 depicts a
discounted sum game GI such that I admits a solution iff CSVpvq ě λ ¨ t.
§ Lemma 15. The target discounted-sum problem reduces to the problem of deciding if
CSVpvq ě c in discounted-sum games.
Proof. Let I “ pa, b, t, λq be an instance of the target discounted sum problem and consider
the game GI depicted in Figure 3. We prove that I admits a solution iff CSVpvq ě λ ¨ t.
Suppose that I admits a solution and let w P ta, buω such that
ř8
i“0 wpiqλ
i “ t. Consider
the following strategy σ for Player 0: for all α P ta, bu˚, σpvsαq “ x if wp|α|q “ x, where
x P ta, bu. We prove that if τ is a best response to σ, then DS0pOutpσ, τqq “ λ ¨ t. In fact,
Player 1 has two choices from v. Let us denote τs (resp. τz) the strategy that prescribes
to Player 1 to proceed to vertex s (resp. z) out from v. We have that DS1pOutpσ, τsqq “
DS1pOutpσ, τzqq “ ´λ ¨ t, by definition of σ and GI . Hence, τs is a best response to σ which
guarantees to Player 0 a payoff DS0pOutpσ, τsqq “ λ ¨ t.
In the other direction, suppose that I does not admit any solution, i.e. there does not
exist an infinite sequence w P ta, buω such that
ř8
i“0 wpiqλ
i “ t. We prove that for any
strategy σ for Player 0, if τ is a best response of Player 1 to σ then DS0pOutpσ, τqq ă λ ¨ t.
Let σ be an arbitrary strategy for Player 0 and consider the strategy τz for Player 1.
We have two cases to consider depending on wether τz is a best response to σ or not. In
the first case, we have that DSpOutpσ, τzqq “ pλ ¨ t´ 1,´λ ¨ tq and, since τz is a best response
to σ, we need to have DS1pOutpσ, τsqq ď ´λ ¨ t. We can not have that DS1pOutpσ, τsqq “
´λ ¨ t, since this would imply DS0pOutpσ, τiqq “ ´DS1pOutpσ, τsqq “ λ ¨ t contradicting our
hypothesis that I does not admit any solution. Therefore, DS1pOutpσ, τsqq ă ´λ ¨ t, meaning
that τs is not a best response to σ and CSVpvq “ λ ¨ t´ 1 ă λ ¨ t.
In the second case, where σz is not a best response to σ, we have that DS1pOutpσ, τsqq ą
´λ ¨ t which implies that CSVpvq “ DS0pOutpσ, τsqq “ ´DS1pOutpσ, τsqq ă λ ¨ t. 
The construction used to link the cooperative Stackelberg value to the target discounted
sum problem can be properly modified2 to prove that infinite memory may be necessary to
allow Player 0 to achieve her CSV, recovering a result originally proved in [15]. In the same
paper, the authors show that in 3-player discounted sum games the cooperative Stackelberg
value cannot be approximated by considering strategies with bounded memory only. In the
next section, we show that this is not the case for 2-player discounted sum games.
Gap problems and their algorithmic solutions We consider a gap approximation of
the Stackelberg value problem in both the cooperative and the adversarial settings. Given
ǫ ą 0 and c P Q, and VAL P tCSV,ASVu, let us define the sets of games:
2 Consider the game GI depicted in Figure 3 for a “ 0, b “ 1, λ “ 2
3
, t “ 3
2
. By Proposition 1 in [7],
Player 0 can achieve 3
2
from s—and therefore CSV(v)=1—only with infinite memory.
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Yesǫ,c
VAL
“ tpG, vq | G is a game with VALpvq ą c` ǫu
Noǫ,c
VAL
“ tpG, vq | G is a game with VALpvq ă c´ ǫu
The CSV-gap (resp. ASV-gap) problem with gap ǫ ą 0 and threshold c P Q consists in
determining if a given game G belongs to Yesǫ,c
CSV
or Noǫ,c
CSV
(resp. Yesǫ,c
ASV
or Noǫ,c
ASV
). More
precisely, solving the Stackelberg value gap problem in e.g. the cooperative setting amounts
to answer Yes if the instance of the game belongs to Yesǫ,c
CSV
, answer No if the instance belongs
to Noǫ,c
CSV
, never answer or answer arbitrarily otherwise.
Theorem 17 below uses the results in Lemma 16 to provide an algorithm that solves the
Stackelberg value gap problem in the cooperative and adversarial settings, for games with
discounted sum objectives. In particular, Lemma 16, shows that finite memory strategies
are sufficient to witness Stackelberg values strictly greater than a threshold c P Q.
§ Lemma 16. Let G be a discounted-sum game and consider c P Q and ǫ ą 0. If Player 0
has a strategy σ0 such that CSVpσ0qpvq ą c` ǫ (resp. ASVpσ0qpvq ą c` ǫ), then Player 0 has
a strategy σ˚
0
with finite memory Mpǫq such that CSVpσ˚
0
qpvq ą c (resp. ASVpσ˚
0
qpvq ą c).
Moreover, Mpǫq is computable given ǫ.
Proof. Let σDS1min P Σ0 be a memoryless strategy for Player 0 minimizing supτPΣ1DS1pOutpσ, τqq.
Let σDS1max P Σ0 be a memoryless strategy for Player 0 that maximizes supτPΣ1DS1pOutpσ, τqq.
Such memoryless strategies exist since 2-player (single-valued) discounted-sum games are
memoryless determined. In particular, σDS1min P Σ0 can be obtained by using standard al-
gorithms for two players (single-valued) discounted-sum games. In turn, σDS1max P Σ0 can be
computed by solving a single player (single valued) discounted-sum game, in which all the
nodes are controlled by the maximizer who aims at maximizing DS1.
Cooperative Setting: Let σ˚ P Σ0pGq be a strategy for Player 0 such that DS0pOutpσ˚, τqq ą
c ` ǫ for some strategy τ P BR1pσ˚q. Denote by π˚ the play π˚ “ Outpσ˚, τq and let N
such that λN
W
1´ λ
ă
ǫ
2
. Given the above premises, consider the finite memory strategy
σ1 P Σ0 for Player 0 that follows σ˚ for the first N steps and then either apply the memory-
less strategy σDS1min P Σ0 or the memoryless strategy σ
DS1
max P Σ0, depending on the history h
followed up to N . In particular, if h “ π˚ďN , then the strategy σ
1 prescribes to Player 0 to
follow σDS1max P Σ0, cooperating with Player 1 at maximizing DS1. Otherwise (h ‰ π
˚
ďN ), the
strategy σ1 prescribes to Player 0 to follow σDS1min P Σ0, minimizing the payoff of the adversary.
We show that a best response τ 1 for Player 1 to σ1 consists in following π˚ up to N and
then applying the memoryless strategy τDS1max P Σ1, i.e. maximizing supσPΣ0DS1pOutpσ, τqq.
Infact, by definition of σ1 and τ 1 we have that:
DS1pOutpσ
1, τ 1qq ě DS1pπ
˚q
for any other strategy τ2 ‰ τ 1 for Player 1:
if Outpσ1, τ2qďN “ x ‰ π˚ďN , then:
DS1pOutpσ
1, τ2qq “ DS1pxq ` λ
NDS1pOutxpσ
DS1
min, τ
2qq ď
ď DS1pxq ` λ
N psupτPΣ1pDS1pOutxpσ
DS1
min, τqqq ď
ď DS1pxq ` λ
N psupτPΣ1pDS1pOutxpσ
˚, τqqq “ DS1pπ
˚q ď DS1pOutpσ
1, τ 1qq
since DS1pπ˚q is the payoff (for player 1) of a best response of Player 1 to σ˚.
if Outpσ1, τ2qďN “ x “ π˚ďN , then:
DS1pOutpσ
1, τ2qq ď DS1pxq ` λ
N ¨ suptDS1pπq | π P PlayspGq ^ π starts at lastpxqu “
“ DS1pxq ` λ
N ¨DS1pOutxpσ
DS1
max, τ
DS1
maxqq “ DS1pOutpσ
1, τ 1qq
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Finally, we show that the best response π1 of Player 1 to σ1 guarantees to Player 0 a
payoff greater than c. Infact, DS0pOutpσ1, τ 1qq ą DS0pπ˚ďN q ´
ǫ
2
ą c `
ǫ
2
´
ǫ
2
“ c, since
DS0pπ
˚
ďN q ą c`
ǫ
2
. Due to the choice ofN , having DS0pπ˚ďN q ď c`
ǫ
2
would lead infact to the
following contradiction: DS0pπ˚q ď DS0pπ˚ďN q`λ
N W
1´ λ
ă DS0pπ
˚
ďN q`
ǫ
2
ď c`
ǫ
2
`
ǫ
2
“ c`ǫ,
i.e. DS0pπ˚q ď c` ǫ.
Adversarial Setting: Let σ P Σ0 be a strategy for Player 0 such that for all τ P BR1pσq it
holds DS0pOutpσ, τqq ą c` ǫ. Let N such that λN
W
1´ λ
ă
ǫ
2
and consider the unfolding T
of Outpσq up to N . For each maximal root-to-leaf branch b of T , color its leaf lastpbq green
if b is the prefix πďN of some play π “ Outpσ, τq such that τ P BR1pσq. Otherwise, let the
leaf lastpbq of b be colored by red. We show that the finite memory strategy σ˚ P Σ0 that
prescribes to Player 0 to follow σ up to N and then:
from each green node apply the memoryless strategy σDS1max P Σ0 (i.e. cooperate with
Player 1 to maximize the payoff DS1)
from each red node apply the memoryless strategy σDS1min P Σ0 (i.e. minimize the payoff
DS1 of the adversary )
is such that ASV pσ˚q ą c. Let d “ suptDS1pOutpσ, τqq | τ P Σ1pGqu and consider π P
Outpσ˚q.
First, we show that if π contains a green node then DS0pπďNq ą c. In fact, DS0pπďN q ą
DS0pπďN q ´ λ
N W
1´ λ
ą c `
ǫ
2
´
ǫ
2
“ c, since λN
W
1´ λ
ă
ǫ
2
by definition of N and since
DS0pπďN q ą c `
ǫ
2
being lastpπďN q a green node (witnessing that πďN is the prefix of a
play π1 compatible with a best response of Player 1 to σ˚, for which DS0pπ1q ą c` ǫ).
Moreover, there is a play π P Outpσ˚q containing a green node for which DS1pπq ě d. This
is because of two reasons. First, a play in Outpσq compatible with a best response to σ by
Player 1 is of the form hvπ1, where hv is a maximal root-to-leaf branch b of T with lastpbq “ v
green (by definition of green nodes). Second, for each hystory hv such that hv is a maximal
root-to-leaf branch b of T with lastpbq “ v green, Outpσ˚q contains a play hvπ¯, where π¯
is a play starting in v maximizing DS1. Therefore DS1phvπ¯q “ DS1phvq ` λNDS1pπ¯q ě
DS1phvq ` λ
NDS1pπ
1qq “ d, where hvπ1 is a play compatible with a best response of Player
1 to σ. To conclude our proof, we need just to show that each play π P Outpσ˚q containing
a red node is such that DS1pπq ă d. Infact, being lastpπďN q red, the history πďN can not
be a prefix of any play in Outpσq compatible with a best response of Player 1 to σ. In other
words, by playing σ Player 0 allows the adversary to gain a payoff that is at most r ă d on
each play π “ hvπ1 with v red. Therefore, switching her strategy from σ to σ˚ (i.e. playing
σ for the first N turns and then switching to the memoryless strategy σDS1min P Σ0) Player 0
is sure to let Player 1 gain a payoff that is at most r1 ď r ă d on each play π “ hvπ1 with v
red.
As a conclusion, against σ˚ Player 1 can achieve at least a value d. Hence, each best
response to σ˚ visits a green node (if it does not, then DS1 ă d which is a contradiction).
This guarantees that DS0 ą c.

The approximation algorithm for solving the Stackelberg values gap problems intro-
duced in Theorem 17 roughly works as follows. Given a discounted sum game G, a ra-
tional threshold c P Q and a tolerance rational value ǫ ą 0, the procedure checks whether
there exists a strategy σ0 P Σ0pGq with finite memory Mpǫq such that ASVpσ0q ą c (resp.
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v0v1 1 2 n v2¨ ¨ ¨
(0,0)
0, T ´
2
3 p0, 0q
pwp1q, 0q pwpnq, 0q
p0, wp1qq p0, wpnqq
(0,0)
Figure 4 Arena for hardness proof of the gap problem.
CSVpσ0q ą c ). If such a strategy exists, the procedure answers Yes, otherwise it answers
No. The correctness of the outlined procedure follows directly from Lemma 16.
§ Theorem 17. The gap problems for both the CSV and ASV are decidable for games with
discounted-sum objectives.
We conclude this subsection by providing a reduction from the partition problem to our
gap problems (for both CSV and ASV), showing NP-hardness for the corresponding problems.
§ Theorem 18. The gap problems for both the CSV and ASV are NP-hard.
Proof. We do a reduction from the Partition problem to our gap problems, working for
both CSV and ASV. Let us consider an instance of the partition problem defined by a set
A “ t1, 2, . . . nu, a function w : A Ñ N0. The partition problem asks if there exists B Ă A
such that
ř
aPB wpaq “
ř
aPAzB wpaq. W.l.o.g., we assume
ř
aPA wpaq “ 2 ¨ T for some T .
To define our reduction, we first fix the two parameters λ P p0, 1q and ǫ ą 0 by choosing
values that respect the following two constraints:
T ¨ λn`1 ą T ´
1
2
` ǫ pT ´ 1q ¨ λn`1 ă T ´
1
2
´ ǫ (5)
It is not difficult to see that such values always exist and they can be computed in polynomial
time from the description of the partition problem. Then, we construct the bi-weighted arena
A depicted in Fig. 4. In this arena, Player 1 has only two choices in the starting state of
the game v0. There, he can either send the game to the state v1, and get a payoff of W ´
2
3
,
or he can go to state 1.
From state 1, Player 0 can simulate a partition of the elements of A by choosing edges:
left edges simulate the choice of putting the object corresponding to the state in the left class
and right edges simulate the choice of putting the corresponding object in the right class.
Let D0 and D1 be the discounted sum obtained by Player 0 and Player 1 when arriving in v2.
Because λ and ǫ have been chosen according to eq. 5 , we have that: D0 ąW ´
1
2
` ǫ^D1 ą
W ´ 1
2
` ǫ if and only if the choices of edges of Player 0 correspond to a valid partition of A.
Indeed, assume that B Ď A is a solution to the partition problem. Assume that Player 0
follows the choices defined by B. Then when the game reaches state b, the discounted sum
of rewards for both players is larger than W ¨ λn`1. This is because along the way to b, the
discounted factor applied on the rewards obtained by both players has always been smaller
than λn`1 as they were equal to λi`1 for all i ď n. Additionally, we know that sum of
(non-discounted) rewards for both players is equal to W as B is a correct partition. Now, it
should be clear that both ASVpv0q and CSVpv0q are greater than W ´
1
2
` ǫ as in the two
cases, Player 1 has no incentive to deviate from the play that goes to v1 as Player 1 would
only get W ´ 2
3
which is strictly smaller than D1.
Now, assume that there is no solution to the partition problem. In that case, Player 0
cannot avoid to give less than W ´ 1 to herself or to Player 1 when going from v0 to b. In
the first case, its reward is less than W ´ 1 and in the second case, the reward of Player 1 is
less than W ´ 1 and Player 1 has an incentive to deviate to state v1. In the two cases, we
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have that both ASVpv0q and CSVpv0q are less than W ´ 12 ´ ǫ. So, we have establish that
the answer to the gap problem is yes if the partition instance is positive, and the answer is
no if the partition instance is negative.

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5 Appendix
5.1 Proofs of Section 3
5.1.1 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. We establish the three statements of this lemma in turn. First, consider the arena
depicted in Fig. 1, where square nodes are vertices controlled by Player 1 while round nodes
are controlled by Player 0. We also give names to Player’s actions to ease the description of
strategies. In this arena, Player 1 can either always play a, noted σω
1
, or play k times a and
then b, noted σk
1
. Now, consider the following strategy σ0 for Player 0 defined as follows: if
Player 1 has played k times a before playing b, then play repeatedly ck followed by one d.
Clearly, playing σω
1
has a mean-payoff value of 0 for Player 2, while playing σk
1
against σ0
has a mean-payoff of 2k`1
k`1 ą 0, so playing σ
ω
1 is clearly not a best-response to σ0. But it is
also clear that for all k1 ă k2, we have that
MP
1
pOutv0pσ0, σ
k1
1
qq ă MP
1
pOutv0pσ0, σ
k2
1
qq
and so we conclude that there is no best-response for Player 1 to the strategy σ0 of Player 0.
Second, as the mean-payoff measure is prefix independent3, we can w.l.o.g. consider a
fixed starting vertex v0 and consider best-responses from there. Let σ0 be a finite memory
strategy of Player 0 in the arena A. We note Apσ0, v0q the finite graph obtained by fixing
the strategy σ0 for Player 0 in arena A from v0. We can consider Apσ0, v0q as a finite one-
player mean-payoff arena as only Player 1 has remaining choices. It is well known that in
a finite one-player mean-payoff arena, there are optimal memoryless strategies: they consist
3 In the sense that for all i P t0, 1u, all infinite plays π and finite plays π1, MP
i
pπ1πq “ MP
i
pπq.
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in reaching one simple cycle with a maximal mean-payoff [16]. The mean-payoff obtained
by such a strategy is the mean-payoff of this cycle and is maximal. A strategy of Player 1
that follows this cycle is thus optimal and it is a best-response to σ0.
Third, let σ0 be any strategy of Player 0. Let Apσ0, v0q denotes the unfolding of the
arena A for vertex v0 in which the choices of Player 0 has been fixed by the strategy σ0. We
refer to Apσ0, v0q as the tree T and to any outcome compatible with σ0 as an infinite branch
b of T . Against σ0, Player 1 cannot obtain a value which is larger than d “ supbPT MP1pbq.
By definition of sup in the real numbers, for all ǫ ą 0, there exists a branch b P T such that
MP1pbq ą d ´ ǫ. So, for every ǫ ą 0, there exists a branch b and a strategy σ
b
1 that follows
this branch against σ0 and which is thus an ǫ-best-response. 
5.1.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. First, consider the game depicted in Fig. 2. First let us show that ASVpv0q “ 1.
For all ǫ ą 0, assume that Player 0 plays σkpǫq
0
defined as: repeat forever, from v1 play one
time v1 Ñ v1 and then repeat playing v1 Ñ v0 for kpǫq times, with k chosen such that the
mean-payoff for Player 0 is larger than 1´ ǫ. Such a k always exists. The best-response of
Player 1 to σkpǫq
0
is to always play v0 Ñ v1 as by playing this edge forever, Player 1 gets a
mean-payoff strictly larger than 1. Clearly, by playing less frequently v1 Ñ v1, Player 0 can
obtain a value which is arbitrary close to 1. But in addition, we note that the only way for
Player 0 to reach value 1 would be to play v1 Ñ v1 with a frequency that goes to 0 in the
limit. And in that case, the mean-payoff obtained by Player 1 would be equal to 1. So it
would not be better than the mean-payoff that Player 1 gets when playing v1 Ñ v2. As a
consequence, in that case v1 Ñ v2 would also be a best-response too, and the adversarial
Stackelberg value of that strategy of Player 0 would be equal to 0.
Second, we show the following equivalence, which directly implies the second part of the
theorem (by taking c “ ASVpvq ´ ǫ): ASVpvq ą c iff Dσ0 P Σ0 ¨ ASVpσ0qpvq ą c.
Let us now prove this equivalence. By definition of ASVpσ0qpvq, we have to show that
ASVpvq ą c iff Dσ0 ¨ Dτ ą 0 : BR
τ
1
pσ0q ‰ ∅^ @σ1 P BR
τ
1
pσ0q : MP0pOutvpσ0, σ1qq ą c.
The right to left direction is trivial as σ0 and τ can play the role of witness of ASVpvq ą c.
For the left to right direction, let c1 “ ASVpvq. By definition of ASVpvq, we have
c1 “ sup
σ0,ǫě0 | BRǫ1pσ0q‰∅
inf
σ1PBRǫ1pσ0q
MP
0
pOutvpσ0, σ1qq ą c
By definition of sup, for all δ ą 0, we have that:
Dσδ
0
¨ Dǫδ ą 0 : BRǫ
δ
1
pσδ
0
q ‰ ∅^ inf
σ1PBRǫ
δ
1
pσδ
0
q
MP
0
pOutvpσ
δ
0
, σ1qq ě c
1 ´ δ
which in turn implies:
Dσδ
0
¨ Dǫδ ą 0 : BRǫ
δ
1
pσδ
0
q ‰ ∅^ @σ1 P BR
ǫδ
1
pσδ
0
q : MP
0
pOutvpσ
δ
0
, σ1qq ě c
1 ´ δ
Now let us consider δ ą 0 such that c1 ´ δ ą c. Such a δ exists as c1 ą c. Then we obtain:
Dσ0 ¨ Dτ ą 0 : BR
τ
1pσ0q ‰ ∅^ @σ1 P BR
τ
1pσ0q : MP0pOutvpσ0, σ1qq ą c.
Finally, we note that the need for memory for ǫ approximation is a consequence of the
example used in Theorem 4. 
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5.1.3 Proof of Lemma 8
Proof. We first give a name to simple paths that are useful in the proof. First, the simple
path that goes from from v to ℓ1, is called π1. Second, the simple path that goes from ℓ1 to
ℓ2 is called π2. Finally, the simple path that goes from ℓ2 back to ℓ1 is called π3.
The right to left direction consists in showing that the existence of π1, π2, π3 and of the
two simple cycles ℓ1, ℓ2 implies the existence of a witness for ASVpvq ą c as required by
Theorem 5. For all i P Nzt0u, we let ρi “ ℓ
rα¨is
1
¨ π2 ¨ ℓ
rβ¨is
2
¨ π3 and define the witness π as
follows:
π “ π1ρ1ρ2ρ3 . . .
It is easy to show that MP
0
pπq “ α ¨w0pℓ1q`β ¨w0pℓ2q which is greater than c by hypothesis.
Indeed, by construction of π, we have that the importance of the non-cyclic part (π2 and π3)
is vanishing as i is getting large, and as the mean-payoff measure is prefix independent, the
role of π1 can be neglected. For the same reason, we have thatMP1pπq “ α¨w1pℓ1q`β ¨w1pℓ2q
which is equal to d by hypothesis. It remains to show that π does not cross a pc, dq-bad
vertex. This is direct by construction of π and point p3q.
Let us now consider the left to right direction. Let π be a witness for ASVpvq ą c. By
Theorem 5, we have that π starts in v, MP0pπq “ c
1 ą c and MP1pπq “ d, and all the
vertices v1 along π are such that v1 * ! 1 " MP
0
ď c ^MP
1
ě d. Let us note D the set
of vertices that appears infinitely often along π. As the set of vertices is finite, we know
that D is non-empty and there exists an index i ě 0 such that the states visited along
πpi . . . q is exactly those vertices in D. So, clearly, in the graph underlying the game arena,
D is a strongly connected component. So, in the strongly connected component D, there
is an infinite play π1 that is such that MP0pπ
1q “ c1 ą c and MP1pπ
1q “ d. According to
Proposition 1 and Theorem 2, if in a strongly connected component, there is a play with
MP
0
pπ1q “ c1 ą c and MP
1
pπ1q “ d there is a convex combination of coordinates of simple
cycles that gives a value px, yq such that x ě c1 and y ě d. As we are concerned here with
mean-payoff games with 2 dimensions, we can apply the CarathÃ©odory baricenter theorem
to deduce that there exists a set of cycles of cardinality at most 3, noted tℓi1 , ℓi2 , ℓi3u, and
αi1 , αi2 , and αi3 , such that the convex hull of vectors pw0pℓi1q, w1pℓi1qq, pw0pℓi2q, w1pℓi2qq,
and pw0pℓi3q, w1pℓi3qq intersects with the set P “ tpx, yq | x ą c^ y ě du. This convex hull
is a triangle. If a triangle intersects P , it has to be the case that one of its edges intersects P .
This edge is definable as the convex combination of two of the vertices of the triangle. As a
consequence, we conclude that there are two simple cycle ℓ1 and ℓ2, and two rational values
α, β ě 0 such that α` β “ 1 and α ¨ w0pℓ1q ` β ¨ w0pℓ2q ą c and α ¨ w1pℓ1q ` β ¨w1pℓ2q ě d.
It remains to show how to construct π1, π2, and π3. For π1, we concatenate a play without
repetition of vertices from vertex v to the set D that only takes vertices also in π, then
when in D, we take a finite play without repetition to the simple cycle ℓ1. For π2, we take
a simple play from the cycle ℓ1 to the cycle ℓ2, and fr π3, we take a simple play from ℓ2 to
ℓ1. The existence of those plays is guaranteed by the fact that D is strongly connected. It
is easy to verify that the constructed plays and cycles have all the properties required. 
5.1.4 Proof of Lemma 9
To establish this lemma, we start from results that have been established in [4] where the
Pareto curve of d-dimensional mean-payoff games is studied.
Pareto curve Before giving the formal details, we recall the notion of Pareto curve associ-
ated with a d-dimensional mean-payoff game. Those games are played between two players,
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called here Eve and Adam, on a game arena where each edge is labelled by a d-dimensional vec-
tor of weights. In such context, we are interested in strategies of Eve that ensure thresholds
as high as possible on all dimensions. However, since the weights are multidimensional, there
is not a unique maximal threshold in general. The concept of Pareto optimality is used to
identify the most interesting thresholds. To define the set of Pareto optimal thresholds, we
first define the set of thresholds that Eve can force from a vertex v:
ThpG, vq “
 
x P Rd | DσD ¨ @π P OutvpσDq ¨ @i : 1 ď i ď d : MPipπq ě xi
(
.
A threshold c P Rd is Pareto optimal from v if it is maximal in the set ThpG, vq. So the set
of Pareto optimal thresholds is defined as:
POpG, vq “ tx P ThpG, vq |  Dx1 P ThpG, vq : x1 ą xu (for the component-wise order)
We refer to this set as the Pareto curve of the game. Note that the set of thresholds that
Eve can force is exactly equal to the downward closure, for the component-wise order, of the
Pareto optimal thresholds, i.e. ThpG, vq “Ó POpG, vq.
Cells We recall here the notion of cells in geometry, which is useful to represent the set of
Pareto optimal thresholds. Let a P Qd be a vector in d dimensions. The associated linear
function αa : Rd ÞÑ R is the function αapxq “
ř
iPJ1,dK ai ¨xi that computes the weighted sum
relative to a. A linear inequation is a pair pa, bq where a P Qdzt~0u and b P Q. The half-space
satisfying pa, bq is the set 1
2
spacepa, bq “ tx P Rd | αapxq ě bu. A linear equation is also
given by a pair pa, bq where a P Qdzt~0u and b P Q but we associate with it the hyperplane
hplanepa, bq “ tx P Rd | αapxq “ bu. If H “
1
2
spacepa, bq is a half-space, we sometimes
write hplanepHq for the associated hyperplane hplanepa, bq. A system of linear inequations
is a set λ “ tpa1, b1q, . . . , pal, blqu of linear inequations. The polyhedron generated by λ is
the set polyhedronpλq “
Ş
pa,bqPλ
1
2
spacepa, bq.
We say that two points x and y are equivalent with respect to a set of half-spaces H,
written x „H y, if they satisfy the same set of equations and inequations defined by H.
Formally x „H y if for all H P H, x P H ô y P H and x P hplanepHq ô y P hplanepHq.
Given a point x, we write rxsH “ ty | x „H yu the equivalence class of x. These equivalence
classes are known in geometry as cells [21]. We write CpHq the set of cells defined by
H. Cells can be represented as a disjunction of conjunctions of strict and non-strict linear
inequations of the form
řd
i“1 ai.xi ą b and
řd
i“1 ai.xi ě b respectively.
§ Theorem 19 ([4]). There is a deterministic exponential algorithm that given a d-dimensional
mean-payoff game G and a vertex v computes an effective representation of POpG, vq and
ValpG, vq as a union of cells or equivalently as a formula of the theory of the reals xR,`,ěy
with d free variables. Moreover, when the dimension d is fixed and the weights are polyno-
mially bounded then the algorithm works in deterministic polynomial time.
While the set Λpvq is not equal to ThpG, vq, the definition of the two sets are similar in
nature (in dimension 2), and we show next that we can adapt the algorithm of [4] used to
prove Theorem 19 to compute a symbolic representation of Λpvq. For that we rely on two
propositions. Each proposition deals with one of the differences in the definitions of Λpvq
and ThpG, vq. First, while in ThpG, vq, Eve aims at maximizing the mean-payoff in each
dimension, for Λpvq, Player 1 wants to minimize the mean-payoff on the first dimension (the
payoff of Player 0) and maximize the mean-payoff on the second dimension (his own Player 1
payoff). But this discrepancy can be easily handled using the following property:
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§ Proposition 20. For all mean-payoff games G, for all play π P PlayG, for all thresholds
c P R, we have that MP
1
pπq ď c if and only if ´MP1pπq ě ´c.
So, if we inverse the payoff on the first dimension on each edge of the game, we end up
with an equivalent game where Player 1 now wants to maximize the value he can obtain on
the two dimensions. We note G1 this new game. The only remaining difference that we need
to deal with in order to be able to apply Theorem 19 is that one of the dimension is now
measured by a mean-payoff sup and not mean-payoff inf. The following proposition tells us
that we can safely replace the limsup mean-payoff by a liminf mean-payoff. This is a direct
corollary of a more general statement in [22]:
§ Proposition 21 (Lemma 14 in [22]). For all mean-payoff games G, for all state v P V , for
all c, d P Q,
v |ù ! 1 " ´MP0 ě ´c^MP1 ě d
if and only if
v |ù ! 1 " ´MP0 ě ´c^MP1 ě d.
By Proposition 20 and Proposition 21, we have shown that it suffices to inverse the
weights of the first dimension in the bi-weighted graph to obtain a two-dim. mean-payoff
game in which the set of thresholds ThpG, vq that Eve can enforce is exactly the set Λpvq.
As a consequence, we can use the algorithm behind Theorem 19 to compute a symbolic
representation (in the theory xR,`,ďy) of this set in ExpTime, achieving to prove Lemma 9.
5.2 Proofs of Section 4
Proof of Theorem 17
Proof. By Lemma 16, if G P Yesǫ,c
ASV
then Player 0 has a strategy with finite memory Mpǫq
such that for all τ P BR1pσ˚q it holds DS
λ
0 pOutpσ
˚, τq ą c. Therefore, to solve the ASV-
gap problem, with gap ǫ and threshold c it is sufficient to apply the following two-steps
procedure:
1. check if there exists a strategy σ P Σ0pGq with finite memoryMpǫq such that ASVpσq ą c.
2. If such a strategy exists answer YES, otherwise answer NO.
In particular, given a finite memory strategy σ for Player 0, checking weather ASVpσq ą c
can be done by first computing the product of the game G with the finite memory strategy
σ. This yields to a single Player game G1 (controlled by Player 1). By [1], the problem of
solving a one-player (single-valued) discounted-sum game can be stated as a linear program.
Therefore, we can use linear programming to determine, for each vertex x of G1, the maximal
discounted sum DS1pπq that Player 1 can obtain by following a path in G1pxq. At this point,
we can delete from G1 each edge that is not consistent with the solution of the above linear
program, obtaining a new (single player) discounted sum games G2 where each play is
consistent with both σ and a best response of Player 1 to σ. Answering weather ASVpσq ą c
finally amounts to determine the minimal discounted sum DS0pπq that Player 1 can obtain
by following a path in G2pvq, i.e. solving again a one player single value discounted sum
game problem.
We conclude by showing that our two-steps procedure answers Yes if G P Yesǫc, answers
No if Noǫc, answers arbitrarly otherwise. Assume G P Yes
ǫ
c. Then, by Lemma 16 Player 0
has a strategy with finite memory Mpǫq witnessing ASV ą c and the algorithm answers Yes.
If G P Noǫc, Player 0 has no strategy witnessing ASV ą c. Therefore Player 0 has no finite
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memory strategy witnessing ASV ą c and the algorithm answers No. The answer of the
algorithm is not guaranteed to be neither Yes nor No if G R Yesǫc Y No
ǫ
c.
The CSV-gap algorithm is similarly defined on the ground of Lemma 16. In particular, to
solve the CSV-gap problem, with gap ǫ and threshold c it is sufficient to proceed as follows:
Check if there exists a strategy σ P Σ0pGq with finite memory Mpǫq such that CSVpσq ą c.
If such a strategy exists answer YES, otherwise answer NO.

